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Abstract
We study the impact of changing relative market access in an enlarged EU on the
economies of incumbent Objective 1 regions. First, we track the impact of external opening
on internal spatial configurations in a three-region economic geography model. External
opening gives rise to potentially offsetting economic forces, but for most parameter con-
figurations it is found to raise the locational attractiveness of the region that is close to
the external market. Then, we explore the relation between market access and economic
activity empirically, using data for European regions, and we simulate the impact of EU
enlargement on Objective 1 regions. Our predicted market-access induced gains in regional
GDP and manufacturing employment are up to seven times larger in regions proximate to
the new accession countries than in “interior” EU regions. We also find that a future Balkans
enlargement could be particularly effective in reducing economic inequalities among the EU
periphery, due to the positive impact on relative market access of Greek regions.
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1 Introduction
Europe’s economic centre of gravity is shifting east. No event marks this tendency more visibly
than the 2004 EU enlargement, which integrates eight Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) fully into the EU’s internal market. Improved access to and from the CEEC economies
is likely to affect production structures not just in the affected new member states but also in
incumbent EU countries.
One can think of a myriad economic mechanisms through which EU enlargement may affect
the economies of Western Europe: increased specialisation according to comparative advan-
tage, enhanced scope for scale economies in a larger European market, changing factor supplies
through movements of workers and capital, stiffer competition from CEEC competitor firms, to
name but the most obvious.1 We focus on a particular aspect of this complex set of economic
effects, the locational implications of a changing spatial configuration of market access at the
level of sub-national EU regions. We abstract from endowment differences and market struc-
ture and ask how the changes in relative market access are likely to affect peripheral regions of
pre-enlargement member states, all else equal.
We first explore this issue in a three-region new economic geography model. Except for
differences in trade costs, space is assumed to be homogenous, and sectoral location is determined
endogenously through the interplay of agglomeration and dispersion forces. Two of the three
regions are relatively integrated (the “EU”), and we track how the economies of these regions are
affected by an opening towards the third region (the “CEECs”). External market opening affects
several spatial forces. Forces related to better access to foreign export markets and cheaper
imports enhance the locational attraction of the border region. Conversely, forces related to
import competition from foreign firms enhance the locational attraction of the interior region.
The interplay of these forces in the nonlinear setup of the model can lead to a variety
of equilibria. We find that, for most parameter configurations, external liberalisation favours
the concentration of the mobile sector in the region that is closer to the outside country (the
“border region”). However, this mechanism is not deterministic. For example, a sufficiently
strong pre-liberalisation concentration of economic activity in the region that is relatively remote
from the outside country (the interior region) can make this concentration globally stable, i.e.
the locational forces triggered by the external opening are insufficient to offset the locational
1For simulations of country-level economic effects from eastward EU enlargement based on fully specified
computable general equilibrium models, see Baldwin, Fancois and Portes (1997), Bro¨cker (1998) and Forslid,
Haaland, Midelfart-Knarvik and Maestad (2002).
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hysteresis of an established agglomeration. For some parameter values the model can even
predict a locational pull towards the interior region (e.g. when the relative size of the mobile
sector is small).
In our empirical analysis we seek to capture the essential features of the theoretical frame-
work without attempting full structural estimation of the model. Our main explanatory variable
is market potential, an inversely distance-weighted average of the economic mass of all European
regions, calculcated individually for each region. We apply an economically relevant measure of
interregional distance by drawing on a set of bilateral estimates of average road freight travel
time. For the economic mass variable we use alternatively regional purchasing-power parity
GDPs, and regional employment in particular sectors (which yields “sectoral market poten-
tials”).
The market potential measures are the main ingredient to the two stages of our empirical
exercise. First, we estimate the relation between, on the one hand, regional per-capita GDP
and regional manufacturing employment, and, on the other hand, computed regional market
potentials for the full sample of up to 202 European regions.2 In the second stage, we take the
estimated first-stage coefficients to simulate the effect of changes in regional market potentials.
The scenario we simulate is stark. We compare a situation where the EU ends at its pre-2004
eastern border (i.e. where market potentials take account only of regions in incumbent member
countries) with a situation where the EU has grown to encompass 25 or even 33 countries (i.e.
where market potentials incorporate also the ten 2004 accession countries, and eight poten-
tial future members in South-Eastern Europe). These simulations thus provide upper-bound
estimates of the pure market-potential effects of EU enlargement on incumbent regions.
Our simulations suggest that the effects on per capita incomes of Objective 1 regions are
small, with an estimated average gain from the 2004 enlargement of 0.93 percent, compared to
0.65 percent for the non-Objective 1 regions. Large magnitudes, however, are found for effects
on manufacturing, the most footloose of broad sectors. Manufacturing employment as a share
of population is predicted by our simulations to expand by 33 percent in Objective 1 regions
on average. This number is surely too high to be plausible, and thus highlights the limits of
our methodology, but it is interesting that we find no region for which our simulations suggest
a negative impact of enlargement on manufacturing employment. We also detect significant
variance across Objective 1 regions: the enlargement-induced boost to manufacturing of the
2Niebuhr (2003) has estimated a similar model for EU+EFTA regions, using average wages as the dependent
variable.
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most affected region (Burgenland, Austria) is seven times larger than that of the least affected
region (South Yorkshire, UK).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model (with the main
algebraic elements given in Appendix A), and Section 3 presents our empirical results. Section
4 concludes.
2 External Market Access and Internal Geography: A Three-
Region Model
We develop a three-region version of Krugman’s (1991) seminal core-periphery model, in order
to study the impact of improved external market access on the internal geography of a trading
bloc. By adopting this framework, we consciously abstract from locational features other than
spatial demand linkages: since regions are assumed to be identical in terms of technologies,
endowments and tastes, we ignore a large and important literature on integration effects other
than the market-size linkages that we study here. We do not claim, therefore, to provide
a comprehensive account of locational changes that might be triggered by EU enlargement.
Rather, we want to focus on the main forces identified by the modern economic geography
literature and to explore them in terms of their implications for the EU periphery as the EU is
being enlarged eastwards.
We confine the exposition of the model in this section to a rough sketch of the main features
and some salient simulations. A detailed exposition of the analytical framework is given in
Appendix A.
2.1 Symmetric Regions: Endogenous Agglomeration
2.1.1 The Basic Model
Consider two countries: a domestic country, which in turn contains two regions, labelled 1 and
2; and a foreign country, labelled 0. We think of the domestic country as the EU, and of the
foreign country as the accession countries. The two regions of the domestic country will stand
for the EU’s border and interior regions, relative to the eastern accession countries.
There are two sectors: monopolistically competitive “manufacturing”, which produces a
differentiated good and stands for all increasing-returns and mobile production activities in
the economy; and “agriculture”, the perfectly competitive immobile sector. Each of the two
production factors is specific to one sector (“workers” and “farmers”). All goods are traded
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among all regions.
The size and composition of the foreign economy is assumed to be fully exogenous. It
contains LA0 agricultural workers and L0 manufacturing workers, which are all immobile. In
the domestic country, regional supply of agricultural labour is fixed: the two domestic regions
contain respectively LA1 and LA2 immobile farmers. In domestic manufacturing, however, only
the total amount of manufacturing labour is fixed: the country has L manufacturing workers,
distributed endogenously among regions: L = L1 + L2. Workers migrate between regions 1
and 2 according to the real wage difference. Following standard practice and without loss of
generality, we normalise the number of domestic manufacturing workers, L = 1. The regional
shares of workers can then be expressed as L1 = λ and L2 = 1− λ.
Product markets of the three regions are separated by trade costs. Manufacturing varieties
produced in region r are sold by firms at mill price, and the entire transaction cost is borne by
consumers. This is because trade costs are of the “iceberg” type: when one unit is shipped,
priced p, only 1/T actually arrives at destination. Therefore, in order for one unit to arrive, T
units have to be shipped, increasing the price of the unit received to pT . Trade in manufactured
goods is subject to such trade costs, which differ across regions. T12 is the internal trade cost,
which applies to interregional domestic trade (with T12 = T21). T01 and T02 are the trade costs
that arise in each domestic region’s trade with the outside economy. To begin with, we assume
T01 and T02 to be equal, and the two domestic regions therefore to be perfectly symmetric. This
assumption will later be relaxed.
The agricultural good is assumed to be traded at zero cost, both interregionally and inter-
nationally. Therefore, its price equalises everywhere: pA1 = pA2 = pA0. We choose units such
that pA = wA in each region. Finally, we use the agricultural good as a nume´raire, therefore
wA = 1 in each region.
2.1.2 External Trade Liberalisation and Internal Geography
What happens to the domestic distribution of manufacturing activity as external trade barriers
are lowered? A decrease in the external trade cost triggers two forces. On the one hand,
cheaper access to the exterior market lowers the incentive for domestic firms to locate near
domestic consumers, which now represent a smaller share of domestic firms’ sales. Thus, the
domestic demand-related agglomeration force is weakened by the increased importance of foreign
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demand.3 For similar reasons, the domestic cost-related agglomeration force is weakened by the
increased importance of foreign supply: foreign firms now represent a more important share of
supply to domestic consumers.4
On the other hand, trade liberalisation also affects the intensity of competition in the do-
mestic country. Increased competition from foreign firms reduces the relative importance for
domestic firms of locating away from domestic competitors, and thus attenuates dispersion
forces.5
Simulations show that, while external liberalisation decreases both internal agglomeration
and dispersion forces, the effect on the dispersion force generally dominates.6 As a result,
the range of parameter values for which domestic manufacturing agglomerates in only one
region decreases in the level of external trade costs. Given the perfect symmetry of domestic
regions, the location of such agglomerations is indeterminate. The same result obtains if we
hold external trade costs constant but let the foreign country get bigger: the larger the outside
economy, ceteris paribus, the greater the probability that domestic manufacturing agglomerates
in one region. The prediction from the model with symmetric domestic regions is clear-cut:
closer economic integration with the external country favours the concentration of domestic
manufacturing activity.7
2.2 Asymmetric Regions: Changing Relative Attractiveness of Border and
Interior Regions
Perfect symmetry of domestic regions is of course a highly unrealistic assumption, and one that
fits badly with our aim to shed light on differential impacts of enlargement across EU regions.
We therefore now allow the two external trade costs to differ. Specifically, we suppose that
domestic region 2 has better access to the foreign market, such that T02 < T01. Hence, we call
region 2 the border region, while we refer to region 1 as the interior region.
3In Appendix equations (15) and (16), income from the foreign country becomes a more important part of
total demand.
4In Appendix equations (18), (19) and (20), an increased presence of the foreign firms now constitutes the
main element that drives down price indices.
5In Appendix equations (18), (19) and (20), as stated before, an increased presence of foreign firms lowers
both price indices, which in turn lowers w1 and w2.
6Simulation results can be provided on request.
7The same qualitative result has been found in related models by Monfort and Nicolini (2000) and Paluzie
(2001). Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) show that this result is reversed if the domestic dispersion force
is assumed to be exogenous and independent of trade costs: in that case external liberalisation favours internal
dispersion. The same qualitative result is obtained by Behrens, Gaigne´, Ottaviano and Thisse (2003), internal
dispersion arises through intensified endogenous internal competition effects.
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2.2.1 Trade Liberalisation
Our simulations reveal two particular features of the asymmetric setup. First, as foreign demand
weakens the domestic agglomeration force, an additional effect appears, because domestic firms
now have an incentive to locate in the region closest to the foreign market. One of the potential
effects of trade liberalization is thus to attract domestic firms towards the border, where they can
reap the full benefit of improved access to foreign demand. Second, as foreign supply weakens
the domestic dispersion force, the interior region allows firms to locate away from the foreign
competitors. Hence, trade liberalisation may attract domestic firms towards the interior region,
where they are relatively sheltered from foreign competition.
Figure 1: Internal Geography and External Openness
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Figure (1) illustrates the impact of these forces according to the degree of trade liberalisation.
It plots real-wage differences between the two domestic regions (ω1 − ω2) against the share of
manufacturing that locates in the interior region (λ).8 An allocation of manufacturing is an
equilibrium either when real wages are equalised, or when manufacturing is totally agglomerated
in one region and the (potential) real wage in the other region is lower. In Figure (1a), the
domestic country is in autarky, and the dispersed configuration turns out to be the only stable
8Specifically, for given values of T01 and T02, we numerically solve for w1 and w2 over a range of values of
λ ∈ (0, 1). We then substitute the obtained w1 and w2 into ∆ω to plot the real-wage curves. Fig (a) is drawn
with T01 = 5.3 and T02 = 3.6. The values of the other parameters are: σ = 4, β = 3/4, µ = 0.4, α = 0.25,
T12 = 2.4.
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equilibrium.9. In Figure (1b), the domestic country trades costlessly with a large foreign country.
The curve tracing relative real wages has shifted to the right and pivoted anti-clockwise: in
Figure (1b), the curve now comes to cross the x axis with a positive slope, meaning that only
the two completely agglomerated configurations are stable equilibria. For this configuration,
we thus find that liberalising trade with the outside world will enhance the relative locational
attraction of the border region. The increase of demand emanating from the foreign country
dominates the competition effect of proximity to foreign firms, and domestic manufacturing
is attracted to the border region. Agglomeration of industry in the interior region remains
possible, however, but only if, before liberalisation, that region has hosted a disproportionately
large share of domestic manufacturing (around 92 percent in the case of Figure (1b)).
2.2.2 Sectoral Composition of the Foreign Economy
We now consider the implications of varying the sectoral composition of of the outside economy.
In Figure (2a), the foreign country is specialised in agriculture, while the domestic economy has
equal amounts of farmers and manufacturing workers. Farmers represent an immobile workforce
and thus a large additional demand without additional competition force. What we see in Figure
(2a) is therefore the result of an increase in the locational attractiveness of the border region
subsequent to trade liberalization. When foreign markets represent larger demand rather than
fiercer competition, integration will favour manufacturing relocation towards the border region.
Conversely, Figure (2b) depicts the case where manufacturing accounts for a bigger share
of labour abroad than at home. The competition effect of lower trade costs with the foreign
country therefore becomes relatively more important, and the forces for agglomeration in the
border region are attenuated. Specifically, in the scenario illustrated in Figure (2b), the basin
of attraction of border-region agglomeration is considerably smaller compared to the scenario
of Figure (2a), and a partially dispersed equilibrium with λ = 0.6 becomes locally stable.
2.2.3 Sectoral Composition of the Domestic Economy
Finally, we investigate the importance of the home country’s sectoral composition for the forces
that shape the spatial distribution of economic activity. Figure (3) features (a) a home country
that hosts more agriculture than industry (LA/L = 1.2) and (b) a home country that hosts
more industry than agriculture (LA/L = 0.8).
9Figure (1) is drawn for a value of T12 for which industry is dispersed in autarky (T01 = T02 =∞)
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Figure 2: Internal Geography and Sectoral Specialisation of the Foreign Economy
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We observe the following patterns: when the home country has a relatively small manufac-
turing sector, the competition effect dominates, and manufacturing is more likely to concentrate
in the interior region. On the other hand, when the home country hosts a relatively large man-
ufacturing sector, agglomeration forces towards the border will be stronger.
In sum, our model suggests that the larger the domestic manufacturing share and the smaller
the foreign one, the stronger will be tendency for domestic manufacturing to relocate towards
the border region. Taken at face value, this result could be interpreted to imply that EU
enlargement will favour the location of industry in regions proximate to the new accession
countries, particularly in those sectors where direct import competition from accession countries
is unlikely to be strong.
3 Empirics
3.1 Market Potential and Regional Activity in the EU: Benchmark Regres-
sions
Our theoretical model shows that external market access can act as a force that shapes the
internal spatial allocation of economic activity even if there are no differences in endowments.
The relatively simple model of economic geography that we work with yields a rich set of
predictions, featuring multiple equilibria, path dependency, and differential effects of market
9
Figure 3: Internal Geography and Sectoral Specialisation of the Domestic Economy
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access dependent on sector composition and region sizes. In our empirical investigation, we
abstract from most of the theoretical complexity and focus on the principal prediction of the
model, that a change in external market access will change the internal distribution of activity.
The question we ask is: given the estimated equilibrium relationship between market access and
the location of activity, how is the change in market access implied by EU enlargement likely
to alter the internal geography of the pre-enlargement EU?
We define market access using Harris’s (1954) market potential function
Mi,J =
∑
j
Yi/dij , j ∈ J, (1)
where i and j denote regions, Y stands for economic mass, d represents bilateral distance, and
J denotes the relevant set of trading regions. A region’s economic mass is defined alternatively
using GDP or sectoral employment. Drawing on the dataset of Schu¨rmann and Talaat (2000),
interregional distances are represented by estimated road-freight travel times between regional
capitals. These estimates take account of road quality, border delays and legal constraints that
affect the speed of road transport (see Appendix B for details on the data used).
The central element of our empirical exercise is to compute estimated market potentials Mˆi
with different assumptions on what constitutes the relevant set of trading regions J . Since we
are interested in the effects of EU enlargement on regional economies of incumbent member
states, we compute Mˆi for regions in the EU15 assuming three different scenarios. In the first
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scenario, J is defined as including only the EU-15 plus EFTA. This implies that, so far as
economic location is concerned, European regions’ market access is defined solely with respect
to established Western European markets. Hence, geographical proximity to regions east of the
pre-2004 eastern EU border is assumed to be economically irrelevant. In the second scenario,
J is defined as including in also the regions of the ten 2004 accession countries. We call this
the EU-25 scenario. Estimated market potentials in the EU-25 scenario imply that proximity
to regions outside of the post-2004 EU+EFTA borders is economically irrelevant. Finally, in
what we call the EU-33 scenario, J in addition includes the possible future accession countries
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro and
Turkey.
Regional activity can be defined in various ways. We retain two activity measures, GDP
per capita, and manufacturing employment (assuming that manufacturing is the most mobile
sector).
The baseline regression model for GDP per capita is as follows:
(GDP/POP )i = β0 + β1Mˆi,J + β2Obj1Dumi +
−→γ
−→
X + ǫi, with J = EU15 + EFTA− i, (2)
where Mˆi,J is the estimated market potential of region i considering only EU15+EFTA partner
regions, Obj1Dumi is a dummy variable for regions belonging to the EU’s “Objective 1” category
of economically lagging regions, and
−→
X is a set of country fixed effects. In order to avoid
simultaneity problems, we have purged Mˆi,J of the region’s own GDP.
Column 1 of Table 1 reports our estimation results for this specification. We find that the
model fits the data well: 42 percent of within-country variation in per-capita GDP is explained
by our market potential measure, and the RESET test suggests no misspecification. The point
estimate on Mˆi,J is statistically significant and implies that a 10 percent increase in a region’s
market potential will increase its per-capita GDP by 1.5 percent.
We then estimated the same model, but replacing the dependent variable by the share of a
region’s population that is employed in the manufacturing sector (ManEmp/Popi). The results
are reported in column 2 of Table 1. We find that GDP-based market potential is considerably
less successful in predicting employment shares than it was in predicting per-capita GDP: the
explanatory power in terms of R-square has fallen significantly, and, more importantly, the
RESET test indicates misspecification. This is in fact not surprising. Our model suggests that
sectoral location may be affected unequally by proximity to different sectors, depending on
whether co-agglomeration forces are positive or negative. Therefore, we have augmented the
11
Table 1: Market Potential Regressions 
 
GDP per capita Manufacturing employment / Population Dependent var.: 
Regressors: (1) (2) (3) 
GDP Market Potential 0.145* 
(0.068) 
0.721* 
(0.181) 
-1.468 
(0.841) 
Manufacturing Market 
Potential 
  
2.676* 
(0.816) 
Distribution Market 
Potential 
  
0.714 
(0.745) 
Financial Services Market 
Potential 
  
-1.104 
(0.693) 
Objective 1 region dummy -0.353* 
(0.032) 
-0.285* 
(0.085) 
-0.302* 
(0.085) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 202 192 192 
Total R-square 0.61 0.47 0.52 
Within R-square 0.42 0.25 0.31 
F statistic on fixed effects 3.32* 6.49* 4.25* 
RESET test, p-value 0.75 0.02 0.14 
Notes: see text for variable definitions;  all non-binary variables in logs;  heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors in parentheses; * denotes statistical significance at 5% level 
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manufacturing baseline specification to include three additional market potential variables: (i)
manufacturing market potential, for which we define Yi in (1) as manufacturing employment;
(ii) distribution market potential, for which we define Yi in (1) as employment in distribution
services; and (iii) financial services market potential, for which we define Yi in (1) as employment
in financial services.10
Column 3 of Table 1 reports the results of the extended model for manufacturing. This model
explains 31 percent of within-country variation in manufacturing employment shares, and the
RESET test no longer suggests misspecification. The estimated coefficients are interesting: The
effect of manufacturing market potential is strongly and significantly positive. This suggests
that positive agglomeration forces dominate the competition effect. We also find a positive
relationship between manufacturing employment and distribution market potential, although
this effect is not statistically significant. Although they are not statistically significant either,
the negative coefficients on GDP market potential and financial services market potential are
suggestive of a pattern that sees manufacturing activities locating away from the main (urban)
economic centres.11 The most striking aspect of our regression results for this model, however,
is the size of the point estimates. The data suggest that the elasticities of manufacturing em-
ployment shares are larger than one (in absolute value) with respect to three of the four market
potential measures in the model. We find, for example, that a 10 percent increase in manu-
facturing market potential (own-region effects not included) will raise a region’s manufacturing
employment share by roughly 27 percent. This finding is consistent with the “home-market
effect” that characterises modern trade and geography models, according to which differences in
market access translate into larger than proportional differences is sectoral production shares.
3.2 EU Enlargement and Objective 1 Regions: Simulations
3.2.1 Regional Per Capita GDP
Our simulation strategy is straightforward. We take the coefficients estimated for the benchmark
regressions (models 1 and 3 of Table 1), recalculate the market potential variable Mˆi by including
the ten 2004 accession countries, and predict per capita GDPs and manufacturing employment
shares in incumbent EU regions on this basis (the EU-25 scenario). These predicted values are
10To avoid simultaneity, we dropped own-region employment in the computation of manufacturing market
potential. Own-region employment was, however, considered in the construction of distribution and financial
services market potential measures. The number of observations in the employment regressions is smaller than
in the GDP regressions, because we lack the relevant data for the regions of former East Germany.
11This is consistent with the finding of Bru¨lhart and Traeger (2003) that, since the 1970s, the share of EU
manufacturing jobs in peripheral regions has been increasing.
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then compared to fitted values from the benchmark regressions.
Table 2:   Regional GDPs  
 
Country Region NUTS 1 GDP Market 
Potential 2 
GDP  
per capita 3 
%-age 
∆GDP, 
EU-25 4 
%-age 
∆GDP, 
EU-33 4 
Austria Burgenland AT11 7,468 13.98 2.116 2.525 
Germany Brandenburg DE4 9,093 14.20 1.049 1.254 
 Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
DE8 8,259 12.94 0.968 1.175 
 Chemnitz DED1 9,996 11.91 1.022 1.230 
 Dresden DED2 9,126 13.93 1.187 1.408 
 Leipzig DED3 10,192 14.92 0.967 1.164 
 Dessau DEE1 10,106 11.92 0.911 1.101 
 Halle DEE2 10,658 13.84 0.884 1.073 
 Magdeburg DEE3 10,193 12.15 0.839 1.021 
 Thuringia DEG 10,885 12.81 0.839 1.028 
Finland Eastern Finland FI13 2,941 14.54 1.255 1.597 
 Northern Finland FI15 2,645 16.64 1.231 1.579 
Greece East Macedonia and 
Thrace 
GR11 2,737 11.54 1.396 2.773 
 Central Macedonia GR12 3,180 12.67 1.389 2.568 
 West Macedonia GR13 2,993 11.66 1.324 2.372 
 Thessalia GR14 3,134 11.85 1.254 2.255 
 Epirus GR21 2,876 8.22 1.247 2.157 
 Ionian Islands GR22 2,690 11.59 1.199 1.994 
 Western Greece GR23 3,225 10.88 1.056 1.785 
 Continental Greece GR24 3,266 12.39 1.126 1.976 
 Peloponnese GR25 3,223 11.04 1.049 1.786 
 Attica GR3 5,017 14.53 1.179 2.034 
 North Aegean GR41 2,180 9.81 1.225 1.999 
 South Aegean GR42 2,221 14.16 1.196 1.915 
 Crete GR43 2,324 13.67 1.211 1.933 
Ireland Border, Midlands, 
West 
IE01 4,819 14.44 0.641 0.853 
 
The results for regional per capita GDP are reported in Table 2. Given the focus of this
study, we report individual results for peripheral regions only, where peripherality is understood
to mean Objective 1 status in the EU’s regional policy. The second-last column of Table 2 lists
percentage differences in predicted per capita GDPs. Given the simple linear functional form
we have imposed, the changes are necessarily positive. On average, our simulations suggest
that Objective 1 regions’ incomes rise by 0.93 percent while those of non-Objective 1 regions
rise by 0.65 percent (last two rows of Table 2). Although these magnitudes may appear small,
they are likely overestimates, since our simulation scenario implies a regime switch from infinite
trade costs at the EU border to trade costs that are as low as those that applied to intra-EU
trade in the late 1990s. We therefore deem the relative information implied in our simulations
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Table 2 contd. 
Italy Campania IT8 7,260 12.61 0.852 1.148 
 Apulia IT91 6,154 13.65 0.908 1.236 
 Basilicata IT92 5,805 13.33 0.836 1.133 
 Calabria IT93 4,826 11.38 0.919 1.257 
 Sicily ITA 4,360 12.61 1.005 1.375 
 Sardinia ITB 4,512 13.93 0.881 1.189 
Portugal North PT11 5,247 12.45 0.633 0.853 
 Centre PT12 5,048 12.20 0.603 0.813 
 Alentejo PT14 4,485 12.43 0.609 0.826 
 Algarve PT15 4,141 14.33 0.652 0.886 
Spain Galicia ES11 5,006 12.31 0.637 0.858 
 Asturias ES12 5,643 14.63 0.601 0.807 
 Castile Leon ES41 6,092 14.82 0.562 0.754 
 Castile La Mancha ES42 5,852 12.90 0.557 0.752 
 Extremadura ES43 5,111 10.55 0.584 0.790 
 Valencia ES52 6,396 14.67 0.628 0.845 
 Andalusia ES61 4,938 11.25 0.668 0.905 
 Murcia ES62 5,607 13.12 0.613 0.827 
Sweden Central Norrland SE07 3,442 19.53 1.071 1.359 
 Upper Norrland SE08 2,921 19.00 1.128 1.439 
UK Merseyside UKD5 12,212 14.50 0.388 0.510 
 South Yorkshire UKE3 12,399 14.61 0.366 0.480 
 Cornwall UKK3 7,350 14.45 0.530 0.698 
 West Wales UKL1 9,201 14.33 0.461 0.605 
Average of Objective 1 regions (50 regions) 5,789 13.24 0.929 1.338 
Average of non-Obj. 1 regions (152 regions) 11,253 20.38 0.653 0.831 
1 Eurostat’s region codes (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) 
2 including regions’ own GDP, considering only EU+EFTA (see text for full definition) 
3 1998 purchasing-power parity data 
4 projected percentage changes in per-capita GDPs with EU-25 and EU-33 enlargement scenarios 
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more informative than absolute magnitudes. Among Objective 1 regions, we indeed observe
considerable variance in the magnitude of estimated effects. Our projected income changes
range from 0.37 percent (South Yorkshire) to 2.12 percent (Burgenland). The maximum effect
is thus almost six times larger than the minimum. Our adopted linear specification implies that
the effect of enlargement is stronger the closer a region is to the accession countries (in terms of
road freight travel time), and the less close it is to alternative large centres of economic activity.12
It is the latter factor that is key to our findings that the effect for Austria’s Burgenland region is
more than twice that for most East German regions, and that the effect for the West of Ireland
is considerably larger than that for all English and Welsh regions.
In a second simulation, we recomputed market potentials to include eight additional countries
that are potential candidates for a next EU enlargement (the EU-33 scenario). Simulated
income changes relative to the EU-only benchmark are reported in the right-most column of
Table 2. With these simulations, we find that the income effects range from 0.48 percent (South
Yorkshire) to 2.77 percent (East Macedonia and Thrace). Given that all of the additional
countries considered in this simulation are located in the Balkans, it is of course not surprising
to find that the strongest effects of such a future enlargment would be felt by Greek regions.
Indeed, according to our simulations, a future Balkans enlargement would add an additional 0.83
percent to the per capita GDP of the average Greek region, while it would boost the regional
income of the average UK Objective 1 region by a mere 0.14 percent.
From regional policy perspective, it might be of interest how the simulated regional income
effects correlate with pre-enlargement relative incomes of Objective 1 regions. The simple corre-
lation coefficient between 1998 real purchasing-power parity per capita GDP and our simulated
EU-25 effect (i.e. between the second and third data columns in Table 2) is -0.07, which is
statistically insignificant. The same correlation but with the EU-33 simulated effects is -0.24,
which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Note finally that the average GDP
effect in the EU-33 scenario is 60 percent larger for Objective 1 regions than for non-Objective
1 regions (final two rows of Table 2). Our simulations therefore suggest that the market-access
effects of the 2004 enlargement will neither exacerbate nor reduce income inequalities among
Objective 1 regions, but that a future Balkans enlargements could reduce these inequalities,
mainly by boosting income in Greece.
12We experimented with nonlinear specifications of our benchmark regressions but did not find them to add
any explanatory power.
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3.2.2 Regional Manufacturing Employment
In a second set of simulations we take the coefficients from our benchmark regressions on man-
ufacturing employment (Table 1, model 3), and apply them to EU-25 market potentials, so as
to obtain predicted post-enlargement employment shares.13 The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3:   Regional Manufacturing Employment 
 
Country Region Manufact. 
Employmt / 
Population  
%-age 
∆man.empl., 
EU-25 1 
Austria Burgenland 5.07 86.9 
Germany Brandenburg n.a. 41.5 
 Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
n.a. 37.7 
 Chemnitz n.a. 38.1 
 Dresden n.a. 46.5 
 Leipzig n.a. 37.7 
 Dessau n.a. 35.9 
 Halle n.a. 33.8 
 Magdeburg n.a. 31.5 
 Thuringia n.a. 29.7 
Finland Eastern Finland 6.44 40.5 
 Northern Finland 7.87 40.7 
Greece East Macedonia and 
Thrace 
5.70 
48.3 
 Central Macedonia 7.50 48.2 
 West Macedonia 8.26 44.8 
 Thessalia 5.12 41.4 
 Epirus 3.77 42.7 
 Ionian Islands 2.48 41.5 
 Western Greece 2.72 35.3 
 Continental Greece 5.73 36.0 
 Peloponnese 3.28 33.9 
 Attica 8.23 40.9 
 North Aegean 3.81 42.6 
 South Aegean 4.08 41.2 
 Crete 3.03 40.8 
Ireland Border, Midlands, West 9.38 23.1 
 
As expected, given the large coefficients obtained in the benchmark regression, the mag-
nitudes of the simulated effects are substantial. We predict increases in the share of regional
populations employed in manufacturing that range from 12.4 percent (South Yorkshire) to to
86.9 percent (Burgenland). Here too, we of course have to interpret absolute magnitudes with
caution. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the fact that all estimated effects are positive is
13Due to lack of sectoral data for non-EU-25 countries, we cannot carry out EU-33 simulations on employment
shares.
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Table 3 contd. 
Italy Campania 3.19 30.9 
 Apulia 3.84 32.8 
 Basilicata 4.10 31.1 
 Calabria 1.74 33.3 
 Sicily 2.35 35.1 
 Sardinia 3.43 31.2 
Portugal North 12.86 21.7 
 Centre 8.01 19.2 
 Alentejo 3.29 20.2 
 Algarve 2.60 21.8 
Spain Galicia 6.54 20.1 
 Asturias 6.94 19.5 
 Castile Leon 6.63 18.1 
 Castile La Mancha 7.58 18.3 
 Extremadura 2.69 19.2 
 Valencia 10.40 20.7 
 Andalusia 3.87 21.9 
 Murcia 6.97 19.5 
Sweden Central Norrland 8.47 38.3 
 Upper Norrland 8.22 38.4 
UK Merseyside 4.93 13.1 
 South Yorkshire 7.73 12.4 
 Cornwall 5.35 19.2 
 West Wales 5.13 16.5 
Average of Objective 1 regions  
(50 regions) 
5.59 32.7 
Average of non-Objective 1 regions      
(152 regions) 
8.76 23.4 
1 projected percentage changes in (manufacturing employment / population) 
with EU-25 enlargement scenario 
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not a necessary result of our specification here, since negative changes would in principle be pos-
sible. The market-access effect of EU enlargement on manufacturing employment in Objective
1 regions thus appears to be unambiguously positive.
The relative pattern of manufacturing effects resembles that found for regional incomes quite
closely: regions that are proximate to the accession countries and relatively far from economic
centres of the pre-enlargement EU benefit relatively more. Variations in the geographical dis-
tribution of manufacturing and service sectors across the regions of accession countries do not
appear to be large enough to affect relative effects on incumbent EU regions significantly.
Finally, we again find that the market access effects of enlargement on average benefit
Objective 1 regions more than non-Objective 1 regions. The simulated increase in manufacturing
employment is 32.7 percent for the average Objective 1 region and 23.4 percent for the average
non-Objective 1 region (last two rows of Table 3).
4 Conclusions
We have explored the implications of changing market access in an enlarged EU, focussing on
peripheral regions of incumbent member states. A three-region version of Krugman’s (1991)
core-periphery model predicts that, for most parameter configurations, external liberalisation
favours the concentration of the mobile sector in the domestic region that is close to the outside
country (the “border region”). Our empirical simulations suggest that the economic impacts
of enlargement are indeed likely to be significantly different depending on regions’ geographic
location relative to the new member states. We find that the effect on regional per-capita income
is six times larger in the most affected Objective 1 region (Burgenland, Austria) than in the
least affected one (South Yorkshire, UK). In terms of manufacturing employment, this difference
rises to a factor seven. We also find that the distribution of market-access related gains from
the 2004 enlargement will not reduce inequality among current Objective 1 regions; but that
a possible future Balkans enlargement would have such an effect, mainly by improving market
access conditions for Greece.
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A A Three-Region Core-Periphery Model
This appendix spells out our three-region version of Krugman’s (1991) geography model.
A.1 Consumers and Price Indices
All consumers share the same Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U =MµA1−µ, with 0 < µ < 1. (3)
M is a composite index of the consumption of the manufactured good, A denotes consumption
of the agricultural good. A share µ of expenditures goes to manufactured goods, and 1− µ to
the agricultural good. The composite index M is defined by the following CES function:
M =
[
n∑
i=1
c
σ−1
σ
i
] σ
σ−1
, (4)
where ci represents consumption of a variety i of the manufactured good, and σ is the elasticity
of substitution between two varieties (σ > 1). Given income Y , each consumer maximises utility
under the budget constraint Y = ApA+
∑n
i=1 cipi. Using (3) and (4), we can derive the following
demand function, representing demand emanating from consumers of region s, addressed to a
producer i located in region r:
ci,rs =
p−σirs∑R
r=0
∑nr
i=1(pirs)
1−σ
µYs, r, s = 0, 1, 2. (5)
Equation (5) contains the spatial framework: there are R = 3 regions, each of them producing
nr varieties of the manufacturing good. Iceberg trade costs imply that the price of each variety
i produced in r and sold in s contains the mill price and the trade cost: pirs = prTrs (because
of the symmetry of all varieties produced in the same region, we henceforth omit the variety
subscript i). We use Trs as a general expression which represents either T12, T01 or T02, assuming
that the trade cost between two regions is identical for both directions of trade flows, and that
Trr = 1. Using (4) and (5), we are thus able to derive the following industrial price index for
each region s:
Ps =
[
R∑
r=0
nr(prTrs)
1−σ
] 1
1−σ
. (6)
Individual demand (5) can now be written as:
crs =
(prTrs)
−σ
Ps
1−σ µYs r, s = 0, 1, 2. (7)
A.2 Producers
Manufactured goods are produced in a monopolistically competitive industry. Each producer
has the same production function, expressed in terms of manufacturing labour: l = α + βq,
where l is the total cost, in terms of labour, of producing q units. l contains a fixed cost α and a
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marginal cost β per additional unit produced. As usual in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model,
we obtain constant mark-up equations for profit-maximising firms:
pr =
(
σ
σ − 1
)
wrβ, (8)
where pr is the price of a variety produced in r and wr is the manufacturing wage in region r.
The equilibrium output of a firm producing in region r is derived from the free entry condition:
q∗r =
α(σ − 1)
β
, (9)
and equilibrium in each region’s labour market allows us to obtain the equilibrium number of
firms in each region:
nr =
Lr
ασ
, (10)
where Lr is the total number of manufacturing workers in region r.
A.3 Short-Rum Equilibrium
We can derive, for a given distribution of labour between regions 1 and 2, the value of wr that
satisfies equations (7), (8), (9), (10) and the equilibrium condition on the goods market. The
manufacturing wage equation for each region r is thus:
wr =
1
β
(
σ − 1
σ
) µβ
α(σ − 1)
 R∑
j=0
YjP
σ−1
j T
1−σ
jr
1/σ (11)
with Yr = wrLr + wArLAr, and wAr equal to 1 because we chose it as a nume´raire. Equation
(11) is a typical wage equation in new economic geography models. It implies that the larger
the number of consumers and the smaller the number of competitors in regions with low trade
costs to r, the higher the nominal wage that a firm producing in r can pay: indeed, the nominal
wage in region r tends to be higher if incomes in other regions with low trade costs to r are
high. On the other hand, wr tends to be lower if other regions with low transaction costs to r
contain a large number of firms (the region’s industrial price index P σ−1j may be regarded as
an index of concentration).
We are now able to characterize entirely the equilibrium variables in our three-region setting,
for a given spatial distribution of workers. Regional incomes are:
Y1 = w1λ+ LA1, (12)
Y2 = w2(1− λ) + LA2, (13)
Y0 = w0L0 + LA0. (14)
Nominal wages are the solution of the following system, where P and Y have to be substituted
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for as functions of wages using (6), (8), (10) and Yr = wrLr + LArwAr:
w1 =
1
β
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
µβ
α(σ − 1)
(
Y0P
σ−1
0
T 1−σ
01
+ Y1P
σ−1
1
+ Y2P
σ−1
2
T 1−σ
12
)]1/σ
, (15)
w2 =
1
β
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
µβ
α(σ − 1)
(
Y0P
σ−1
0
T 1−σ
02
+ Y1P
σ−1
1
T 1−σ
12
+ Y2P
σ−1
2
)]1/σ
, (16)
w0 =
1
β
(
σ − 1
σ
)[
µβ
α(σ − 1)
(
Y0P
σ−1
0
+ Y1P
σ−1
1
T 1−σ
01
+ Y2P
σ−1
2
T 1−σ
02
)]1/σ
. (17)
The industrial price indices are then given by:
P1 =
(
σβ
σ − 1
)(
1
ασ
)1/1−σ [
L0(w0T0)
1−σ + λw1−σ
1
+ (1− λ)(w2T12)
1−σ
]1/1−σ
, (18)
P2 =
(
σβ
σ − 1
)(
1
ασ
)1/1−σ [
L0(w0T0)
1−σ + λ(w1T12)
1−σ + (1− λ)w1−σ
2
]1/1−σ
, (19)
P0 =
(
σβ
σ − 1
)(
1
ασ
)1/1−σ [
L0w
1−σ
0
+ λ(w1T0)
1−σ + (1− λ)(w2T0)
1−σ
]1/1−σ
. (20)
We finally derive the real wage of each domestic region, which is made of the nominal wage
deflated by the price index:
ω1 =
w1
Pµ
1
,
ω2 =
w2
Pµ
2
.
A.4 Long-Run Equilibrium
In the long run, industrial workers are mobile: they move to the region with the highest real
wage, according to the following law of motion:
dλ
dt
=

∆ω if 0 < λ < 1
min {0,∆ω} if λ = 1 ,
max {0,∆ω} if λ = 0
(21)
∆ω being the real wage differential.
We are interested in identifying the spatial equilibria of the model, i.e. the distributions of
workers for which no worker will earn a higher real wage by changing location. The equilibrium
distributions of the workforce consist of the values of (λ, 1 − λ) for which either ω1 − ω2 =
0 and λ ∈ (0, 1), or ω1 − ω2 ≥ 0 and λ = 1, or ω1 − ω2 ≤ 0 and λ = 0.
As is typical in Krugman’s core-periphery framework, ω1−ω2 is not a simple function of λ: we
are unable to determine the parameter values that accommodate spatial equilibria analytically.
We therefore use numerical simulations in order to examine real wage differentials and their
implied locational structures.
The equilibrium spatial distribution of the IRS sector inside the domestic country depends
on the interaction of agglomeration and dispersion forces appearing in the equations we derived
above. On the one hand, agglomeration forces arise through the fact that firms and consumers
are interested in locating in the same region because of cost and demand externalities: in
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equations (15) and (16), a large number of consumers in a region r or in nearby regions represents
high local expenditure, allowing firms to pay higher wages, and thus attracting more firms. The
cost externality appears in equations (18), (19) and (20): a high number of firms implies a large
number of locally produced varieties, a lower price index and thus more immigrant consumers.
On the other hand, a dispersion force arises through fiercer competition on goods and factor
markets when industrial activity is concentrated: equations (15) and (16) imply that the nominal
wage of a region diminishes with an increase in competition. This effect pushes firms to relocate
towards the interior region in order to benefit from weaker competitive pressures.
B Data
B.1 Interregional Road Freight Travel Times
Our estimated interregional effective distances are based on the Schu¨rmann-Talaat (2000) dataset
for NUTS 2 regions. Effective (i.e. economically relevant) distances are represented by road
freight travel times in hours, which are in turn obtained by multiplying geographic road dis-
tances with estimated average travel speeds in km/h. Estimated travel speeds are a function
of road categories, border delays, ferry port delays, statutory speed limits and statutory rest
periods for drivers (for details, see Schu¨rmann and Talaat (2000)).
The Schu¨rmann-Talaat estimates for intra-regional travel times are based on the assumption
that average intra-regional trip length is 10 km everywhere. Taking account of unequal region
sizes, we assume instead that intra-regional distances can be approximated as a proportion of
the radius of a circle whose area represents that of the region (see Head and Mayer, 2002, for a
discussion of this and alternative intra-region distance estimations). Where our market potential
variables included own-region components, we set that proportion to 1/3 and assume average
intra-regional travel speeds to be 30 km/h, so that d̂ii = 2 ∗ 0.33 ∗
√
areai
pi .
Estimated intra-region travel times for the EU and CEEC regions range from 5 minutes
(Brussels) to 2 hours 26 minutes (O¨vre Norrland, Sweden), and estimated inter-region travel
times range from 34 minutes (Brussels - Brabant) to 113 hours (South Aegean, Greece - Northern
Norway).
B.2 Regional GDP and Employment
For GDPs of NUTS 2 regions, we use Eurostat’s data for 1998, based on purchasing-power
parity exchange rates. For the EU, EFTA and CEEC regions (2004 accession countries), these
GDPs range from EUR 0.6 bn (A˚land, Finland) to EUR 335 bn (Ile de France). The market
potential indices for the EU-33 sample furthermore incorporate country-level GDPs for Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Serbia-Montenegro.
Sectoral employment data for 1998, covering manufacturing, distribution services and finan-
cial services in NUTS 2 regions of EU15 countries plus Norway and Switzerland, are taken from
the regional database compiled by Cambridge Econometrics. Corresponding data have been
obtained from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) and from the
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) for five CEECs (Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia). Hence, our “EU-25” scenario of Table (3) does not incorporate
data for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.
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